Abstract. A set theoretical assertion ψ is forceable or possible, written ♦ ψ, if ψ holds in some forcing extension, and necessary, written ψ, if ψ holds in all forcing extensions. In this forcing interpretation of modal logic, we establish that if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provable principles of forcing are exactly those in the modal theory S4.2.
Introduction
What are the most general principles in set theory relating forceability and truth? We are interested in how the set theoretical method of forcing affects the first order theory of a model of set theory. As with Solovay's celebrated analysis of provability, both this question and its answer are naturally formulated with modal logic.
1 We aim to do for forceability what Solovay did for provability.
Forcing was introduced by Paul Cohen in 1962 in order to prove the independence of the Axiom of Choice AC and the Continuum Hypothesis CH from the other axioms of set theory. In an explosion of applications, set theorists subsequently used it to construct an enormous variety of models of set theory and prove many other independence results. With forcing one builds an extension of any model V of set theory, in an algebraic manner akin to a field extension, by adjoining a new ideal object G, a V -generic filter over a partial order P in the ground model V , while preserving ZFC. The resulting forcing extension V [G] is closely related to the ground model V , but may exhibit different set theoretical truths in a way that can often be carefully controlled. The method has become a fundamental tool in set theory.
Because the ground model V has some access via names and the forcing relation to the objects and truths of the forcing extension V [G] , there are clear affinities between forcing and modal logic. (One might even imagine the vast collection of Main Definition 1. A modal assertion ϕ(q 0 , . . . , q n ) is a valid principle of forcing if for all sentences ψ i in the language of set theory, ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) holds under the forcing interpretation of ♦ and .
The validity of ϕ, therefore, is expressible as a scheme in set theory. We say that ϕ(q 0 , . . . , q n ) is a ZFC-provable principle of forcing if ZFC proves all such substitution instances ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ). This naturally generalizes to larger theories with the notion of a T -provable principle of forcing. For any model W |= ZFC, the modal assertion ϕ(q 0 , . . . , q n ) is a valid principle of forcing in W if all substitution instances ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) are true in W . Hamkins posed the question:
Main Question 2. What are the valid principles of forcing?
For the ZFC-provable principles of forcing, our Main Theorem 6 provides the answer. Meanwhile, a few paragraphs ago, we essentially observed the following.
Theorem 3. Every assertion in the modal theory S4.2 is a ZFC-provable principle of forcing.
Proof. The modal theory S4.2 is obtained from the axioms
by closing under modus ponens and necessitation (from ϕ, deduce ϕ). We observed earlier that each axiom is a valid principle of forcing, provably so as a scheme in ZFC. The ZFC-provable principles of forcing are clearly closed under modus ponens, and they are closed under necessitation because if ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) holds in all models of set theory, then so does ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ).
Let us quickly show that none of the modal theories most commonly considered beyond S4.2 are ZFC-provable principles of forcing. This follows from our main theorem, but we find it informative to have explicit failing instances of the principles; they are what pointed to S4.2 as the right choice.
Observation 4. If ZFC is consistent, then none of the above assertions is a ZFCprovable principle of forcing.
Proof. (5) Let ϕ be the assertion "V = L," where L denotes Gödel's constructible universe. This is easily forced, and once true it remains true in all further extensions. Thus, ♦ ϕ holds in L, but not ϕ itself. So 5 is not valid for forcing over L.
(M) This is the McKinsey axiom, also known as .1. The Continuum Hypothesis CH is forceable over any model of set theory (see [Jec03, ex. 15 .15]), so ♦ CH holds. But ¬CH is also forceable ([Jec03, 14.32]), so ♦ CH fails. Thus, M is invalid for forcing in every model of ZFC.
(W5) Let ϕ be the assertion "ω L 1 < ω 1 or CH," which is true in L, but not necessary there, since one can force ¬CH without collapsing ω L 1 . Since one could collapse ω L 1 , however, ϕ is forceably necessary in any model of set theory. Thus, ♦ ϕ holds in L, but not ϕ → ϕ, and so W5 fails as a principle of forcing in L.
(.3) Let ϕ assert "ω (Grz) This is the Grzegorczyk axiom. Since Grz is stronger than Dm, it is invalid in L by the previous case. We will show, however, that Grz is invalid in every model of set theory. Let ϕ be the CH. Since ¬CH is forceable over any model of set theory, ϕ is always false, and so ϕ → ϕ is equivalent to ¬ϕ. So this instance of Grz reduces to ( ¬CH → CH) → CH. Since CH is always forceable, ¬CH is false, making the first implication, and the hypothesis of this instance of Grz, vacuously true. So this axiom instance will fail whenever CH fails. Similar reasoning shows that if ϕ is ¬CH, then the corresponding axiom instance fails if CH holds. So Grz fails as a principle of forcing in every model of set theory.
(Löb) This axiom expresses the content of Löb's theorem in provability logic, where one interprets ϕ as "ϕ is provable." Under the forcing interpretation, however, it is invalid, because in fact it contradicts S4. If ϕ is any contradiction, such as 0 = 1, then ϕ is false, and consequently ( ϕ → ϕ) is always true. So in any model of set theory, the hypothesis of this instance of the Löb axiom is true, while the conclusion is false. So Löb is never a valid principle of forcing.
(H) Let ϕ be the CH. As we have mentioned, this is necessarily possible, so ♦ ϕ always holds. In this case, therefore, ( ♦ ϕ → ϕ) is equivalent to ϕ, which is false. So H fails in any model where CH is true. By using ¬CH in the other models, we conclude that H fails as a principle of forcing in every model of set theory.
The corresponding modal theories, listed in Figure 1 with their implication diagram, are obtained by closing the axioms under modus ponens, substitution and necessitation. This list is not exhaustive, as there are continuum many modal theories above S4.2 that are not listed. We refer the reader to [CZ97] and [BdRV01] for excellent developments of modal logic, including the analysis of these and many other theories. So if the ZFC-provable principles of forcing constitute any previously known modal theory, then the best remaining candidate is S4.2.
This article is intended primarily for two audiences: set theorists interested in the fundamental principles of forcing and modal logicians interested in the application of their subject to set theory. While we felt it necessary in the arguments to assume a basic familiarity with forcing, we do provide references to specific elementary forcing results in the standard graduate set theory textbooks where this might be helpful. We were able to provide in our arguments a complete account of the necessary concepts from modal logic. Sections 2 and 3 cover the proof of our Main Theorem 6, which answers our Main Question 2 above. Section 2 contains a complete proof of the main theorem written primarily with the set theoretical reader in mind, and Section 3 emphasizes certain aspects of the proof for the modal logicians. After this, we apply our technique fruitfully in Sections 4-6 to various other instances of Main Question 2, by restricting the focus to a given model of set theory, by investigating the role of parameters in the valid principles of forcing, and by restricting attention to a natural class of forcing notions, such as those with the countable chain condition.
The main theorem
Our main theorem provides an answer to Question 2.
Main Theorem 6. If ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provable principles of forcing are exactly those in the modal theory S4.2.
The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem. We begin with the key concepts of buttons and switches, which generalize the important features of the substitution statements arising in the proof of Observation 4. Specifically, a switch is a statement ϕ of set theory such that both ϕ and ¬ϕ are necessarily possible, so that by forcing ϕ can be switched on or off at will. For example, the CH is a switch, because you can ensure either CH or ¬CH by forcing over any model of set theory. In contrast, a button is a statement that is (necessarily) possibly necessary. The button is pushed when it is necessary, and otherwise unpushed. The idea is that you can always push a button by making it necessary, but having done so, you cannot unpush it again. The assertion "ω L 1 is countable" is a button because it can be forced over any model of set theory and once it becomes true it remains true in all further extensions. This button is unpushed in L. The reader is invited to check that a statement is possibly necessary if and only if it is necessarily possibly necessary; at bottom, this amounts to the S4.2 validity of ♦ ϕ ↔ ♦ ϕ. Thus, a button remains a button in every forcing extension. Although it may seem at first that buttons and switches are very special sorts of statements, we invite the reader to check that in fact every statement in set theory is either a button, the negation of a button, or a switch (and these types are disjoint).
A collection of buttons b n and switches s m is independent in a model if first, all the buttons are unpushed in the model and second, necessarily (that is, in any forcing extension), any of the buttons can be pushed and any of the switches can be switched without affecting the value of any of the other buttons or switches. In other words, the collection of buttons and switches is independent in W if the buttons are unpushed in W , but in any forcing extension W P , whatever the pattern of buttons and switches is in W P , any button can be turned on by forcing to some W P * Q without affecting the value of any of the other buttons or switches, and any switch can be turned either on or off by forcing to some W P * Ṙ without affecting the value of any of the other buttons or switches. It follows, of course, that any finite pattern of buttons and switches being on or off is possible by forcing over W . For an account of buttons, switches and independence in an arbitrary Kripke model, see Definition 8 and the accompanying text.
We note that the counterexample substitution instances showing the forcing invalidity of the modal assertions in Observation 4 were each Boolean combinations of independent buttons and switches. Proof. For positive natural numbers n and m, let the button b n be the assertion "ω L n is not a cardinal," and let the switch s m be the assertion "the GCH holds at ℵ ω+m ." If V = L, then it is clear that none of the buttons is true, but in any model of set theory, the button b n can be made true by collapsing ω L n , without affecting the truth of any other button or the properties of the GCH above ℵ ω (see [Jec03, 15.21] A pre-lattice is obtained from a lattice by replacing each node with a cluster of one or more equivalent nodes, all related by ≤. Equivalently, it is a partial pre-order ≤ (a reflexive and transitive relation) on a set F , such that the quotient of F by the equivalence relation u ≡ v ↔ u ≤ v ≤ u is a lattice under the induced quotient relation ≤. Proof. The idea is to use the buttons as in Lemma 6.2 to determine which cluster is intended in the quotient lattice, and then use the switches to determine which node is intended within this cluster. Let [u] denote the equivalence class of u in the quotient lattice F/≡, and let p [u] be the label assigned to [u] in Lemma 6.2. Thus, p [u] is the disjunction of various complete patterns of buttons having supremum [u] . Suppose that the largest cluster of F has k nodes, and 
We now prove that this works. In any forcing extension of W , we know by Lemma 6.2 that exactly one p [u] is true. Furthermore, any forcing extension exhibits some pattern A of switches being true, and this A is assigned to exactly one w ∈ [u], so exactly one s w is true for w ∈ [u]. Thus, in any forcing extension, exactly one p w = p [u] ∧ s w is true. We arranged that p w 0 is true in W by the assignment of the pattern of switches holding in W to the world w 0 .
If W P is a forcing extension satisfying p w , then both p [w] and s w hold in We now state some definitions from modal logic. A propositional world, also called a state, is a map of the propositional variables to the set {true, false}. This is simply a row in a truth table. A Kripke model M is a set U of propositional worlds, together with a relation R on U called the accessibility relation. The Kripke semantics define when a modal assertion ϕ is true at a world w in a Kripke model M , written (M, w) |= ϕ. Namely, for atomic assertions, (M, w) |= q if q is true in w; for Boolean connectives, one uses the usual inductive treatment; for necessity, (M, w) |= ϕ if whenever w R v, then (M, v) |= ϕ; and for possibility, (M, w) |= ♦ ϕ if there is v with w R v and (M, v) |= ϕ. The underlying frame of the model M is the structure U, R , ignoring the internal structure of the elements of U . The reader may easily check that every Kripke model whose frame is a partial pre-order satisfies S4, and every Kripke model on a directed partial pre-order satisfies S4.2. A deeper fact is Lemma 6.5, that the finite pre-lattice frames are complete for S4.2. If Λ is a modal theory and every Kripke model with frame F satisfies Λ at every world, then F is a Λ-frame. A modal theory Λ has the finite frame property if whenever Λ ϕ, then there is a finite Λ-frame F and a Kripke model having frame F in which ϕ fails. A class F of frames is complete for a modal theory Λ if every F ∈ F is a Λ-frame and any ϕ true in all Kripke models having frames in F is in Λ. In this case, we also say that Λ is defined by F. Two Kripke models M and M are bisimilar if there is a correspondence of their worlds a ∼ a for a ∈ M , a ∈ M , not necessarily functional or one-to-one, such that corresponding worlds have the same truth assignments to the propositional variables, and whenever a accesses b in M and a ∼ a , then there is some b in M such that b ∼ b and a accesses b in M , and conversely, whenever a ∼ a and a accesses b in M , then there is some b ∼ b such that a accesses b. It follows by induction that corresponding worlds in M and M have exactly the same modal truths.
The next lemma is the heart of our argument, where we prove that the behavior of any Kripke model on a finite pre-lattice can be exactly simulated by forcing.
Lemma 6.4. If M is a Kripke model whose frame is a finite pre-lattice with a world w 0 and W is a model of set theory with a sufficiently large independent family of buttons and switches, then there is an assignment of the propositional variables q i to set theoretical assertions ψ i , such that for any modal assertion ϕ we have
Proof. Each ψ i will be a certain Boolean combination of the buttons and switches. We have assumed that the frame F of M is a finite pre-lattice. We may assume without loss of generality that w 0 is an initial world of M , by ignoring the worlds not accessible from w 0 . Let p w be the assertions assigned according to Lemma 6.3. Since w 0 is an initial world of F , we may ensure that W |= p w 0 . Let
We will prove the lemma by establishing the following stronger claim:
This is true for atomic ϕ, since q i is true at w if and only if p w is one of the disjuncts of ψ i , in which case p w → ψ i in any forcing extension of W , and conversely if p w → ψ i is true in a forcing extension where p w is true, then ψ i must be true there, in which case q i is true at w in M . If the statement is true for ϕ 0 and ϕ 1 , then it is also true for
, so there is a forcing extension W P satisfying p w and ¬ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ). Since the truth values of ψ i necessarily depend only on the values of the various p u , it follows that all forcing extensions with p w will satisfy ¬ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ). So we have proved W |= (p w → ¬ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n )), as desired, and reversing the steps establishes the converse.
which occurs if and only if
is forceable over any extension of W with p w . Since all such extensions have p u for some u ≥ w and the ψ i depend only on the values of p v , it must be that W |= (p u → ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) for some u ≥ w. By induction, this is equivalent to (M, u) |= ϕ(q 0 , . . . , q n ) and consequently to (M, w) |= ♦ ϕ(q 0 , . . . , q n ), as desired.
The next step of our proof relies on a fact about S4.2. A tree is a partial order ≤ on a set F such that the predecessors of any node are linearly ordered. A pre-tree is a partial pre-order ≤ on a set F such that the quotient F/≡ is a tree; each node of this tree is effectively replaced in F with a cluster of equivalent nodes. A baled tree is a partial order ≤ on a set F having a largest node b ∈ F , such that F \ {b} is a tree (imagine baling or tying the top branches of a tree together, as in Figure 2) . A baled pre-tree is the result of replacing each node in a baled tree with a cluster of equivalent nodes; equivalently, it is a partial pre-order whose quotient by ≡ is a baled tree. Note that every baled tree is a lattice, and every baled pre-tree is a pre-lattice. A partial pre-order is directed if any two nodes have a common upper bound. . The order on F is by end-extension of the paths t and the F 0 order on u, with [b] still maximal. The worlds within any copy of a cluster are still equivalent and consequently still form a cluster, and so F is a baled pre-tree. Let M be the resulting Kripke model on F , obtained by also copying the propositional values from every world u ∈ F 0 in M 0 to the copies u, t of it in F . It is easy to see that M is bisimilar with M 0 , according to the correspondence that we have defined, because every world accesses in M copies of the worlds its corresponding world accesses in M 0 and only such copies. It follows that every world in M 0 satisfies exactly the same modal truths in M 0 that its copies satisfy in M . Consequently, ϕ fails at the copy of w 0 in M . Thus, ϕ fails in a Kripke model whose frame is a finite baled pre-tree, and all such frames are pre-lattices.
Proof of Theorem 6. Finally, we prove the theorem. By Theorem 3, the set of ZFCprovable principles of forcing includes S4.2. If ϕ is not in S4.2, then by Lemma 6.5, there is a Kripke model M on a finite pre-lattice in which ϕ fails at an initial world. It is well known that if ZFC is consistent, then so is ZFC+V = L, and so by Lemma 6.1, there is a model of set theory L having an infinite independent family of buttons and switches. By Lemma 6.4, there is an assignment of the propositional variables of ϕ to sentences ψ i such that L |= ¬ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ). Therefore, ϕ is not a valid principle of forcing in L, and hence not a ZFC-provable principle of forcing.
The Jankov-Fine formula
While the previous section was written with a set theoretical reader in mind, let us now emphasize certain points for the modal logicians. The main theorem can be restated in a way (as follows) that aligns it with many other completeness theorems in modal logic. Modal logicians will recognize that Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3 assert exactly that the assertions p w fulfill the relevant Jankov-Fine formula, which we now define. For any graph F = U, E , assign a propositional variable p w to each vertex w ∈ U of the graph and let δ(F ) be the following formula, the Jankov-Fine formula. It asserts that, necessarily, exactly one p w is true, and if p w is true, then ♦ p v if and
.4 has nothing essentially to do with set theory, but rather only with Kripke models and the Jankov-Fine formula: 
Proof. We argue just as in Lemma 6.4. Let p w be the assertions in N satisfying the Jankov-Fine formula. Let ψ i = { p w | (N, w) |= q i }. We establish the following stronger claim by induction on ϕ: ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) ).
The atomic case holds by the definition of ψ i . Conjunction follows because distributes over ∧. Negation follows via the properties of the Jankov-Fine formula, because every world in N (accessible from u 0 ) satisfies exactly one p w , and any two such worlds agree on every ψ i . Possibility follows using the Jankov-Fine formula again, since p u is possible from a world with p w if and only if w ≤ u in F . Finally, the stronger claim implies the lemma, because p w 0 is true at u 0 in N . Similarly, the concepts of button and switch are not set theoretic; they make sense in any Kripke model. Specifically: Definition 8. A button is a statement that is necessarily possibly necessary, and a switch is a statement such that it and its negation are necessarily possible. A family of buttons {b i } i∈I and switches {s j } j∈J is independent in M at world u if none of the buttons is necessary at u and necessarily, any button can be turned on and any switch can be turned either on or off without affecting the other buttons and switches.
This can be expressed precisely in modal logic as follows. For any A ⊆ I and
∈B ¬s j ) assert that the pattern of the buttons and switches is specified by A and B. The family {b i } i∈I ∪ {s j } j∈J of buttons and switches is independent if
Thus, the buttons are off initially, and necessarily, from any possible pattern of buttons and switches, any larger pattern of buttons and any pattern of switches is possible. The main technique in our proofs of Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3 appears to be very reminiscent of Smoryński 
The lemmas combine to prove Theorems 6 and 7 as follows. Let Λ be the ZFCprovable principles of forcing. It is easy to see, as in the proof of Theorem 3, that Λ is closed under substitution, modus ponens and necessitation. By Theorem 3, we know S4.2 ⊆ Λ. By Lemma 6.1, if ZFC is consistent, then there are models of set theory having infinite independent families of buttons and switches. It follows that Λ is consistent with arbitrarily large finite independent families of buttons and switches. By Lemma 7.3, therefore, Λ is consistent with the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F ) ∧ p w 0 for any finite pre-lattice F . By Lemma 7.2, therefore, all such F are Λ-frames. By Lemma 6.5, any statement not in S4.2 fails in a Kripke model having such a frame and consequently is not in Λ. So Λ ⊆ S4.2 and, consequently, Λ = S4.2.
Let us now push these techniques a bit harder, in order to arrive at a new class of frames complete for S4.2 and some useful characterizations of S4, S4.2 and S5. A partial pre-order (B, ≤) is a pre-Boolean algebra if the quotient partial order B/≡ is a Boolean algebra. The Kripke model N produced in Lemma 9 has the smallest frame supporting an independent family of n buttons and m switches, because for independence one needs worlds realizing every pattern (A, B) of buttons and switches.
Lemma 10. A class F of frames is complete for S4.2 if and only if every F ∈ F is an S4.2 frame and there are Kripke models, with frames in F, for arbitrarily large finite independent families of buttons and switches.
Proof. The forward implication is immediate, because S4.2 is consistent by Lemma 9 with the existence of large independent families of buttons and switches. Conversely, suppose the latter property. If ϕ 0 is not in S4.2, then by Lemma 6.5 there is some Kripke model M whose frame F is a finite pre-lattice such that (M, w 0 ) |= ¬ϕ 0 (q 0 , . . . , q n ). Let (N, u 0 ) be a Kripke model with frame in F having an independent family of n buttons and m switches, where n is the number of clusters in F and the size of any cluster is at most 2 m . By the proof of Lemma 7.3, there are assertions p w for w ∈ F such that (N, u 0 ) |= δ(F ) ∧ p w 0 . By Lemma 7.1, there is an assignment of the propositional variables q i of M to assertions ψ i in N such that (M, w 0 ) |= ϕ(q 0 , . . . , q n ) if and only if (N, u 0 ) |= ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) . By the assumption on ϕ 0 , this means that (N, u 0 ) |= ¬ϕ 0 (ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ). Thus, a substitution instance of ϕ 0 fails at a world in N , a Kripke model whose frame is in F. So this class of frames is complete for S4.2. Proof. All of these frames are directed partial pre-orders, and so they are all S4.2 frames. Lemma 6.5 shows that any statement not in S4.2 fails in a Kripke model whose frame is a finite baled pre-tree, and hence a finite pre-lattice and a finite directed pre-order, so these classes are complete for S4.2. The new part of this theorem is (4). By Lemma 9 the class of finite pre-Boolean algebras has Kripke models for arbitrarily large finite independent families of buttons and switches. So by Lemma 10, this class is also complete for S4.2. Proof. Lemma 7.2 shows that (2) implies (3), as the elements of F must be finite directed partial pre-orders. For (3) implies (4), observe that if ϕ / ∈ S4.2, then it must fail in a Kripke model whose frame is in F, contrary to (3). For (4) implies (2), note that S4.2 and δ(F ) ∧ p w 0 are true together in the Kripke model having frame F , with p w true exactly in the world w. For (4) implies (1), if Λ ⊆ S4.2, then Λ is true in the Kripke models constructed in Lemma 9, which have large independent families of buttons and switches. Finally, Lemma 7.3 shows that (1) implies (2) in the special case where F is the class of all finite pre-lattices, and hence (1) implies (4) for any F, since they do not depend on F, completing the proof.
Our later analysis will benefit from similar characterizations of S4 and S5. For S5, we use the fact that the class of finite complete reflexive graphs is complete for S5. This result will be applied in Theorem 17.
Theorem 13. Suppose that a modal theory Λ contains S4 and is closed under substitution. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) Λ is consistent with arbitrarily large finite independent families of switches.
(2) Λ is consistent with the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F ) ∧ p w for any finite complete graph F and world w ∈ F . (3) Every finite complete reflexive graph is a Λ-frame. (4) Λ ⊆ S5.
Proof. For (1) implies (2), the point is that when F has only one cluster, the argument of Lemma 6.3 does not require any buttons. Suppose that N is a Kripke model having an independent family of switches {s j } j∈J . For any A ⊆ J, define s A as in Lemma 6.3 to assert that the pattern of switches is A. Partition the collection of A ⊆ J among the worlds u ∈ F by assigning a nonempty set A u of sets to each world u in F . Let s u = A∈ A u s A as in Lemma 6.3. By assigning whatever pattern of switches holds at u 0 to the world w, we can arrange that (N, u 0 ) |= s w . Since every world must have some unique pattern of switches, it follows that (M, u 0 ) satisfies that necessarily, exactly one s u is true. Furthermore, since the switches are independent, we also know that (M, u 0 ) |= s u for any u ∈ F . Since all worlds in F are accessible from each other, this implies (N, u 0 ) |= δ(F ) ∧ p w , as desired.
Lemma 7.2 shows that (2) implies (3). Also, (3) implies (4) because any statement not in S5 is known to fail in a Kripke model whose frame is a finite complete reflexive graph (see [CZ97, Proposition 3.32, Corollary 5.29]). Finally, if Λ ⊆ S5, then Λ holds in any Kripke model whose frame is a complete graph. It is easy to arrange independent families of switches in such Kripke models, just by ensuring that every possible pattern of switches is exhibited in some world.
In the S4 context, one can generalize Theorems 12 and 13 to the following, which we expect will be relevant for Question 36. Recall that a modal logic Θ has the finite frame property if whenever Θ ϕ, then there is a finite Θ-frame F and a Kripke model M with frame F in which ϕ fails. Such theories as S4, S4.2, S4.3 and S5 are known by [CZ97,  (1) Λ is consistent with the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F ) ∧ p w 0 for any frame F ∈ F and world w 0 ∈ F . (2) Every frame in F is a Λ-frame. (ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) . In particular, if ϕ fails in such an M , then the corresponding substitution instance of it will fail in N |= Λ. So every such F is a Λ-frame, and we have proved (1) implies (2). For (2) implies (3), observe that if ϕ is not in Θ, then it fails in a Kripke model M having a finite frame F ∈ F. Since F is a Λ-frame, we know that M |= Λ and consequently ϕ is not in Λ. So Λ ⊆ Θ. For (3) implies (1), observe that the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F ) ∧ p w 0 is easily satisfied at a Kripke model M having frame F , where p w is true exactly at w. Since F is a Θ-frame, we know that M |= Θ and consequently M |= Λ by (3), so (1) holds, and the proof is complete.
We do not have a button-and-switch characterization of S4 in Theorem 14, because the frame of an S4 model need not be directed, and it is not true that every possibly necessary statement is necessarily possibly necessary. Under S4, one can have assertions ϕ such that, simultaneously, ϕ is possibly necessary, ¬ϕ is possibly necessary, and ϕ is possibly a switch. Thus, for the S4 context, we emphasize the official definition of button as a statement that is necessarily possibly necessary. Such examples show that unlike S4.2, under S4 it is no longer true that every statement is a button, the negation of a button or a switch.
Forcing over a fixed model of set theory
While our main theorem establishes that the ZFC-provable principles of forcing are exactly those in S4.2, it is not true that every model of set theory observes only these validities. For any W |= ZFC, recall that a modal assertion ϕ is a valid principle of forcing in W if for all sentences ψ i in the language of set theory we have W |= ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ). For meta-mathematical reasons connected with Tarski's theorem on the non-definability of truth, there is initially little reason to expect that the collection of such ϕ should be definable in W ; rather, the assertion that ϕ is valid in W is expressed as a scheme, asserting all substitution instances ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ) in W . So this is formally a second-order notion. Because a statement is provable in ZFC exactly when it holds in all models of ZFC, our main theorem establishes that the modal assertions ϕ that are valid in all models of set theory are exactly those in S4.2. Our proof, however, established the following stronger result.
Theorem 15. If W is a model of set theory with arbitrarily large finite independent families of buttons and switches, then the valid principles of forcing in W are exactly

S4.2.
This result is stronger because it shows that the minimal set of forcing validities is realized in a single model of set theory (such as any model of V = L), rather than arising as the intersection of the validities of several models. Nevertheless, there are models of set theory whose valid principles of forcing go beyond S4.2. For example, the Maximality Principle MP of [Ham03] asserts all instances of the scheme ♦ ψ → ψ, so that any set theoretic statement ψ that holds in some forcing extension and all further extensions is already true. In other words, MP asserts that S5 is valid for forcing. Because it is established in [Ham03] that if ZFC is consistent, then so is ZFC + MP, we conclude:
Theorem 16. If ZFC is consistent, then it is consistent with ZFC that all S5 assertions are valid principles of forcing.
The forcing validities of a model, however, never go beyond S5.
Theorem 17. The valid principles of forcing in any model of set theory are included within S5.
Proof. Let Λ be the set of forcing validities in a model W of set theory. By Theorem 3, this includes all of S4.2. Also, Λ is easily seen to be closed under substitution. Observe next that any model of set theory has an infinite independent family of switches, such as s n = "the GCH holds at ℵ n ." These and their negations are forceable in any finite pattern over any model of set theory by well known forcing arguments. It follows that Λ is consistent with the modal assertions that there are large independent families of switches. By Theorem 13, consequently, Λ ⊆ S5.
Corollary 18. If ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of set theory whose valid principles of forcing are exactly S5.
Our results establish that both S4.2 and S5 are realized as the exact set of forcing validities of a model of set theory (realized, respectively, in models of V = L or of MP). 
Theorem 21. Suppose that W is a model of ZFC set theory.
( Proof. Statement (1) is the content of Theorems 3 and 17. Over S4, the additional S5 axiom is equivalent to ♦ ϕ → ϕ, which exactly asserts that every button is pushed. So (2) and (3) hold. For (4), suppose that b 0 , b 1 are semi-independent buttons in W , and let ϕ = (
, which asserts that either neither or both buttons are pushed. Thus, ϕ is both true and possibly necessary in W , since the buttons are initially unpushed and we could push both, but ϕ is not necessary, since we could push just b 0 ; this violates W5. For (5), suppose that W has two independent buttons b 1 and b 2 . We argue as in Observation 4. Let ϕ = b 1 ∧ ¬ b 2 and ψ = b 2 ∧ ¬ b 1 . Since both buttons are unpushed in W and either may be pushed, we conclude that W |= ♦ ϕ ∧ ♦ ψ. But in any forcing extension of W , if ϕ is true, then ψ is impossible and vice versa. So this instance of the conclusion of .3 fails in W . Thus, .3 is not valid in W , and so Force W does not include S4.3. For (6), suppose that W has an independent family of one button b and one switch s. We follow the argument of Observation 4, case Dm. We may assume that both b and s are false in W . Let ϕ = b ∨ s. This is possibly necessary in W , since one could push the button b, but not true in W , so ♦ ϕ → ϕ is false in W . In any forcing extension of W , if (ϕ → ϕ), then it must be that the button b has been pushed there, since otherwise one could make ϕ true and then false again by flipping the switch s. So we have argued that ( (ϕ → ϕ)) → ϕ holds in every forcing extension of W . Thus, the hypothesis of this instance of Dm holds in W , while the conclusion fails, so Dm is not valid in W . This establishes (6).
Semi-independent buttons are part of the following more general arrangement. A list of assertions ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n is a volume control if each is a button, pushing any of them necessarily also pushes all the previous, and any of them can be pushed without pushing the next. More precisely:
The idea is that one can turn up the volume to level j by forcing ϕ j , but there is no turning it down again. The volume control has volume zero if ¬ ϕ 1 (and so a volume control of length n has n + 1 many volume settings). These volume controls exhibit the linear dependence of buttons, rather than independence. If buttons b 0 and b 1 are semi-independent, then b 0 , (b 0 ∧ b 1 ) is a volume control of length 2; conversely, every volume control of length 2 at volume zero consists of two semi-independent buttons. Similar ideas with more buttons produce arbitrarily long volume controls. A Kripke model with a linear frame of n + 1 clusters admits volume controls of length n but no independent buttons. A family of volume controls, buttons and switches is independent in a model if all the volume controls have zero volume in that model, all the buttons are unpushed in that model, and in any forcing extension, one can operate any of the volume controls, buttons and switches without affecting any of the others.
Theorem 22. If W is a model of set theory exhibiting arbitrarily long volume controls independent from arbitrarily large families of independent switches, then
Proof. We know by [CZ97, 3.31, 3.32, 3.40, 5.33] that the finite linear pre-orders are a complete class of S4.3 frames. Suppose that F is such a finite linear pre-order and w 0 is a node in the minimal cluster of F . Let v 1 , . . . , v n be a volume control in W , where n is the number of clusters of F , and suppose that this volume control forms an independent family with the switches s 0 , . . . , s m , where the size of any cluster is at most 2 m . As in Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3, we will assign to each node w ∈ F an assertion p w , so that W satisfies the Jankov-Fine formula δ(F ) ∧ p w 0 . Specifically, within each cluster [u] , assign to each node w ∈ [u] a nonempty set A w of subsets A ⊆ n in such a way that these partition all subsets A ⊆ n, and define s w = A∈ A w s A , as in Lemma 6.3. In the least cluster, we assign the pattern A of switches holding in W to the node w 0 . Now, for any node w ∈ F , if w is in the i th cluster, then we define p w = v i ∧ s w . That is, the volume control indicates the intended cluster and the switch indicates the intended node within that cluster. Since every forcing extension of W exhibits some volume setting and some pattern of switches, it is clear that it will satisfy exactly one of the p w , and in any extension of W where p w holds, then ♦ p v holds if and only if w ≤ v. Thus, the JankovFine formula δ(F ) ∧ p w 0 is satisfied. It now follows by Theorem 14 that F is a Force W -frame. So every S4.3-frame is a Force W -frame, and so Force W ⊆ S4.3.
George Leibman has observed that a volume control of length ω 2 , with sufficiently uniform assertions, can be used to construct an independent family of one volume control of length ω and infinitely many switches, as follows. One divides the ω blocks into increasingly large finite blocks, with the position within these sub-blocks indicating the configuration of the switches, and the current ω block indicating the overall new volume of length ω. Thus, it is sufficient in Theorem 22 to have merely a (sufficiently uniform) volume control of length ω 2 , or actually volume controls of length ω · n for arbitrarily large n, without worrying about independent switches.
We close this section with a curious question. A modal theory is normal if it is closed under modus ponens, substitution and necessitation. All the named modal theories that we have considered, such as S4, S4.2, S4.3, Dm.2, S5 and so on, are normal. Meanwhile, the set of valid principles of forcing in any model of ZFC is easily seen to be closed under modus ponens and substitution. 
The modal logic of forcing with parameters
We know from [Ham03] that parameters play a subtle role in the strength of the Maximality Principles. While MP is equiconsistent with ZFC, allowing real parameters in the scheme results in the principle MP(R), which has some large cardinal strength; allowing uncountable parameters leads to inconsistency. Allowing real parameters from all forcing extensions leads to a principle MP(R) with a large cardinal strength of at least infinitely many Woodin cardinals (but less than AD R + Θ is regular). So let us analyze the role played by parameters in the valid principles of forcing. Specifically, define that ϕ(q 0 , . . . , q n ) is a valid principle of forcing in a model W with parameters in X if for any set theoretical formulas ψ i ( x) we have
We denote the collection of such ϕ by Force W (X). The next theorem provides another answer to Question 2. Proof. Let b n be the assertion "ω W n+1 is not a cardinal" and for positive m, let s m be "the GCH holds at ℵ ω+m ," referring to ℵ ω+m de dicto, rather than with a parameter. In any forcing extension of W , any of the buttons can be forced without affecting the truth of the other buttons, by collapsing ω W n+1 to its predecessor (see [Jec03, 15.21] ). After this, the switches s m and their negations can be forced in any desired pattern without adding bounded sets below ℵ ω and, consequently, without affecting the buttons b n (see [Jec03, 15.18 and related]).
The result now follows from Theorem 15 and the observation that the existence of parameters can simply be carried through that argument. Specifically, if ϕ is not in S4.2, then it fails at some world w 0 in a Kripke model M whose frame is a finite pre-lattice. As in the Main Theorem, we use the buttons and switches to define p w for each world w in M verifying the Jankov-Fine formula as in Lemma 6.3. If we define ψ i as in Lemma 6.4, then we observe as before that (M, w 0 ) |= ϕ(q 0 , . . . , q n ) if and only if W |= ϕ(ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n ). Since ϕ fails at w 0 in M and the ψ i are Boolean combinations of the buttons and switches, this produces a failing substitution instance of ϕ in W using the same parameters.
Theorem 25. For any W |= ZFC and any sets
Proof. Certainly any S4.2 assertion is valid, even with parameters, so S4. Proof. We will build an independent family of buttons and switches. In W , let ω 1 = n S n be a partition of ω 1 into infinitely many disjoint stationary subsets S n . Let b n assert "S n is not stationary". Each assertion b n is false in W , since the S n are stationary there, but in any forcing extension, by shooting a club through the complement of any S n , we can force b n to be necessary, while preserving all stationary subsets of the complement of S n (see [Jec03, 23. This stationary set idea provides an alternative source of independent buttons for Lemma 6.1, because if V = L, then one can use the L-least partition of ω 1 into ω many stationary sets; one advantage here is that this provides arbitrarily large finite independent families of buttons that can be pushed without collapsing cardinals. Indeed, the button to collapse ω L 1 is equivalent to the infinite conjunction of these independent buttons.
Returning 
Proof. We show L ω 1 ≺ L by verifying the Tarski-Vaught criterion. This claim should be understood metatheoretically and proved as a scheme. Suppose that
But it is certainly forceably necessary, because we could make ϕ(u) true by collapsing cardinals until the least witness v in L is hereditarily countable. In other words, ϕ(u) is a button in W . The parameter u, being in L ω 1 , is hereditarily countable and can therefore be coded with a real. Meanwhile, the assertion CH is a switch, and this switch is independent of ϕ(u), because the CH and its negation can be forced over any model without collapsing ω 1 and therefore without affecting the truth of ϕ(u). Since we have an independent button and switch in W using a real parameter, it follows by Theorem 21, case (6), that Dm is not valid in W with real parameters, contrary to our assumption that Dm is valid for forcing over W with real parameters.
By relativizing to any real x, we similarly conclude that There are many open questions here, which we leave for future projects. Let us close the paper by observing that even with ccc forcing, the situation changes dramatically.
Theorem 34. If ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provable principles of ccc forcing do not include S4.2.
Proof. It is easy to deduce in S4.2 the following Directedness axiom:
We will show that the ccc interpretation of this Directedness axiom is not valid in L. This proof relies on the fact, a part of mathematical folklore, that there are two fundamentally different ways to destroy a Suslin tree by ccc forcing. If T is a Suslin tree, then of course forcing with T itself adds a branch through T , making it non-Aronszajn. Alternatively, if T is Suslin, then there is ccc forcing making T into a special Aronszajn tree, a union of countably many antichains (see [Jec03, 16.19 and related]). No further forcing can add a branch through this tree without collapsing ω 1 , since the branch would have to contain at most one node from each antichain. Thus, these two alternatives cannot be amalgamated by ccc forcing. If ϕ is the assertion "the L-least Suslin tree is not Aronszajn" and ψ is the assertion "the L-least Suslin tree is special," then each of these statements is possibly necessary by ccc forcing over L, but their conjunction is false in all ccc extensions of L. Thus, ( ♦ ccc ccc ϕ) ∧ ( ♦ ccc ccc ψ) holds in L, but not ♦ ccc ccc (ϕ ∧ ψ), violating Directedness.
Corollary 35. The same conclusion holds for any class Γ of forcing notions containing all ccc forcing, whose members in any ccc extension preserve ω 1 . This includes the classes of proper forcing, semi-proper forcing, cardinal-preserving forcing, and so on.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 34, the assertions ϕ and ψ are each ccc-forceable over L and once true, they are necessary by all forcing. Consequently, they are each Γ-forceably necessary in L. The conjunction ϕ ∧ ψ, however, is not forceable by ω 1 -preserving forcing over L, and hence not Γ-forceable over L. So the Γ-forcing validities in L do not include S4.2.
Nevertheless, one can easily verify that S4 remains valid for ccc forcing (and also for the other classes).
Question 36. What is the modal logic of ccc forcing? Does it go beyond S4?
A complete set of S4 frames consists of finite pre-trees (partial pre-orders whose quotients are trees), and with them one might try to carry out a similar analysis as in our Main Theorem, by finding set theoretical assertions to fulfill the JankovFine assertions. The point is that branching in these trees gives rise to behavior totally unlike either buttons or switches. Branching corresponds in set theory to the possibility of ccc forcing extensions that cannot be amalgamated by further ccc forcing, as in the folklore fact above, where one chooses either to specialize a Suslin tree of L or to make it not Aronszajn. What is needed, therefore, is an elaborate generalization of this folklore idea, in which one can successively make choices with ccc forcing that cannot later be amalgamated by ccc forcing, in such a way that every ccc forcing extension is included.
While Theorem 34 shows that the ZFC-provable ccc modal validities do not include all of S4.2, it is not currently clear conversely whether they are included within S4.2. To prove that they are, it would suffice to find a model of ZFC with arbitrarily large independent families of ccc buttons and switches.
Under Martin's Axiom MA, of course, the product of ccc posets is again ccc, and this implies that the Directedness Axiom is valid for ccc forcing. But we seem unable to prove that this axiom is necessary under MA, since MA itself is easily destroyed by ccc forcing: adding even a single Cohen real creates Souslin trees. In the ccc analogue of Question 23, it is not clear whether the collection of the modal validities of ccc forcing is closed under necessitation. Thus, we seem unable to conclude that S4.2 is valid for ccc forcing over any model of MA.
Question 37. What are the ZFC + MA-provably valid principles of ccc forcing?
Lastly, we mention that for ccc forcing, unlike the general situation with Corollary 31, there is no large cardinal strength to the hypothesis that S5 is valid for ccc forcing with real parameters. Specifically, [Lei04] proves that if ZFC is consistent, then there is a model of ZFC in which every S5 assertion is valid for ccc forcing with real parameters. If one wants S5 to be valid for ccc forcing with parameters in H 2 ω , however, then [Ham03] shows that it is equiconsistent, as in Corollary 31, with a stationary proper class of inaccessible cardinals.
